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THE FUTURE OF THE SIMILAR FACT RULE IN AN INDIAN 
EVIDENCE ACT JURISDICTION: SINGAPORE 
 
Chen Siyuan* 
 
In yet another attempt to bridge the gap between the rules of an antiquated statute and the modern 
realities of practice, Singapore’s Evidence Act was amended in 2012. Certain relevancy provisions 
were amended to allow greater admissibility of evidence. While new provisions were introduced to act 
as a check against abuse, oddly some similar fact provisions were left intact. This paper explains why 
the 2012 amendments have rendered the future of these enactments very uncertain. This paper also 
suggests a number of tentative recommendations as regards future legislative change or judicial 
interpretation. To the extent that Singapore’s Evidence Act was largely modelled after Stephen’s 
Indian Evidence Act of 1872, this paper may be of comparative interest to readers in India, as well as 
to readers in other Commonwealth jurisdictions that had also adopted the iconic statute. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s seminal Indian Evidence Act of 1872 has had 
an enduring legacy. Many Commonwealth jurisdictions which had modelled their evidence 
legislation after this seminal work in the late 1800s continue to retain the legislation. 
Singapore, which originally enacted its Evidence Act (‘EA’)1  in 1893, is one of them. In yet 
another attempt to modernise the EA,2 the statute was amended in 2012. Amongst the 
amendments were changes made to the provisions on hearsay and expert opinion evidence.3 
Specifically, the scope for the admissibility of such evidence was broadened to take into 
account the practices and realities of modern litigation, but the concept of judicial 
exclusionary discretion was also expressly introduced to curtail admissibility if needed.4 In 
other words, the courts can now exclude certain types of hearsay and expert opinion evidence 
even if they are found relevant under the EA. Strangely, however, the provisions on similar 
fact evidence were left completely intact.  
 
This omission is a surprise, since the EA provisions on similar fact evidence, 
like those on hearsay and expert opinion evidence, also represent codified exceptions to the 
so-called exclusionary rules provided in Part I of the EA.5 Thus, to statutorily limit the 
judicial discretion to exclude relevant evidence to hearsay and expert opinion evidence 
creates an immediate incongruity. Moreover, the local jurisprudence interpreting the 
provisions on the similar fact rule has long been riddled with extreme doubt and 
inconsistency, and the 2012 amendments could have helped resolve this, but this was not 
done or even contemplated.6 This paper, as its title suggests, considers the future of the 
similar fact rule in Singapore and the key obstacles standing in the way of meaningful reform. 
 
 
                                                 
* L.L.B. (National University of Singapore); L.L.M. (Harvard). Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore 
Management University. I would like to thank the editors for their prompt but painstaking editorial work. All 
errors remain mine. 
1 Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed.  
2 The two other major amendments took place in 1976 and 1996. 
3 These two types of evidence, of course, are conceptually intertwined.  
4 See Evidence (Amendment) Bill, 2/2012.  
5PAUL ROBERTS AND ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 99 (2010) ( Under the common law, other 
exclusionary rules include confessions and the privilege against self-incrimination). 
6 See also Chin Tet Yung, Remaking the Evidence Code: Search for Values, 21 (1) SACLJ 54,70-72 (2009) .  
 
 
A. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE RULE 
 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to briefly understand what the 
similar fact rule entails and why it exists. In many common law jurisdictions, the similar fact 
rule is traditionally part of a broader subject known as character evidence.7 In the criminal 
law context,8 the rule “essentially limits the admissibility of evidence that goes not towards 
proving directly that an accused has committed the crime he has been charged with but 
towards his past conduct, and that may form a basis for inferring that the accused has 
committed the said crime.”9 The default prohibition of admitting similar fact evidence is 
essentially premised on two main considerations.  
 
The first consideration is institutional in nature and applies generally to most 
exclusionary rules, in that only the most relevant evidence should be admitted to prevent or 
reduce: (i) the introduction of collateral and tangentially relevant issues; (ii) unnecessary 
protraction of the length and cost of the trial; (iii) distraction or confusion of the fact-finder; 
and (iv) implicit judicial endorsement of sloppy criminal investigation.10  
 
The second main consideration is perhaps more specific to similar fact 
evidence and relates to the concept of prejudice, in that while an accused’s past conduct may 
seem intuitively and logically relevant and therefore aid in the court’s search for the truth, 
such evidence may be more prejudicial than probative because: (i) it is generally unconnected 
to the offence but may unduly influence the fact-finder by painting the accused as a criminal 
from the outset; (ii) it may catch an accused by surprise in court when he is confronted with 
evidence from his past; (iii) there is a risk of cognitive error vis-à-vis the inference of 
recidivism; and (iv) ultimately, it may be given undue weight as to its relevance.11  
 
B. BASIS OF THE RULE IN SINGAPORE 
 
It is also necessary to briefly understand how the EA has conceptualised the 
admission of similar fact evidence. The EA was an endeavour to codify the common law 
rules of evidence as it stood in the late 1800s.12 This is reflected as well in § 2(2), which 
states that “All rules of evidence not contained in any written law, so far as such rules are 
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, are repealed.” This means that as long as § 
2(2) is still in force, which it is, the EA – and not the common law – must always be 
considered as a starting point of analysis when a question of evidence law is raised, and if 
there is a conflict between the EA and the common law position, the EA must prevail without 
exception.13  
                                                 
7 ROBERTS & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 5, 581; COLIN TAPPER, CROSS & TAPPER ON EVIDENCE 371–376 (2010). 
The other components are the common law rules on character evidence of all witnesses and the statutory rules 
governing the cross-examination of accused persons. It should be noted, however, that in England, § 99(1) of the 
Criminal Justice Act, 2003 abolished the common law rules governing the admissibility of evidence of bad 
character in criminal proceedings. 
8 The similar fact rule (as does the EA) also applies in the civil context, but has  a far greater impact in criminal 
cases – such as the ones discussed in this paper. 
9 Chen Siyuan, Revisiting the Similar Fact Rule in Singapore, SING. J.L.S. 553 (2011). 
10 Id., 554; Ho Hock Lai, An Introduction to Similar Fact Evidence, 19 SING. L REV. 167 (1998); JEFFREY 
PINSLER, EVIDENCE AND THE LITIGATION PROCESS 63 (2010). 
11 Siyuan, supra note 9, 554–555; Hock Lai, id.,167–170. See also Michael Hor, Similar Fact Evidence in 
Singapore: Probative Value, Prejudice and Politics, SING. J.L.S. 48 (1999). 
12 PINSLER, supra note 10, 18–19. 
13 Law Society of Singapore v. Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [116]–[129] ; Lee Chez Kee v. 
Public Prosecutor, [2008] 3 SLR(R) 447 at [72]–[75]. See also Chen Siyuan, The Judicial Discretion to Exclude 
 
 
 
In this connection, it is widely assumed that the similar fact rule is captured by 
§§ 14 and 15 of the EA – however, it is also widely assumed that these sections, at best, only 
extend to the mens rea aspect of the rule.14 A perusal of the two sections demonstrates this 
quite readily:15 
 
14.  “Facts showing the existence of any state of mind, such as intention, 
knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or good-will 
towards any particular person, or showing the existence of any state of 
body or bodily feeling, are relevant when the existence of any such 
state of mind or body or bodily feeling is in issue or relevant.16 
 
15. When there is a question whether an act was accidental or intentional 
or done with a particular knowledge or intention, the fact that such act 
formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the 
person doing the act was concerned, is relevant.”17 
 
As for the actus reus aspect of the rule, precedent states that t it is found in § 
11(b), which states that “Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant … if by themselves or in 
connection with other facts they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue or 
relevant fact highly probable or improbable.”18 This is, however, a controversial claim19 that 
will be revisited shortly. The immediate question that confronts us is: should the 2012 
amendments to the EA be characterized as a missed opportunity, and how will the 
interpretation of the similar fact rule provisions be affected?  
 
II. WHY THE SIMILAR FACT RULE IN SINGAPORE REQUIRES REFORM 
 
A. FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF THE EA  
 
To begin answering this question, one must have a keen understanding of the 
fundamental features of the EA, particularly as to how it determines the admissibility of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Relevant Evidence: Perspectives from an Indian Evidence Act Jurisdiction, 16(4) INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 
400–402 (2012). 
14 Siyuan, supra note 9, 557–561; Chen Siyuan, The 2012 Amendments to Singapore’s Evidence Act: More 
Questions than Answers as Regards Expert Opinion Evidence?, 34(3) STATUTE L. REV. 271 (2013); VR 
MANOHAR, RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 150–159 (2011). 
15 For completeness, one should also be aware of § 55 (previous good character of an accused person is relevant 
evidence in criminal proceedings) and §56 (prosecution may dispute such evidence if adduced) of the EA. 
However, these provisions do not impact the current discussion. Then there are also the related common law 
concepts of collusion and corroboration, but to elaborate on those will take us well outside the confines of 
thispaper. 
16 See also illustration (o): “A is tried for the murder of B by intentionally shooting him dead. The fact that A on 
other occasions shot at B is relevant as showing his intention to shoot B. The fact that A was in the habit of 
shooting at people with intent to murder them is irrelevant.” 
17 See also illustration (a): “A is accused of burning down his house in order to obtain money for which it is 
insured. The facts that A lived in several houses successively, each of which he insured, in each of which a fire 
occurred, and after each of which fires A received payment from a different insurance office, are relevant as 
tending to show that the fire was not accidental.” 
18 Lee Kwang Peng v. Public Prosecutor, [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569, 41–47; Public Prosecutor v. Radhakrishna 
Gnanasegaran, [1999] SGHC 107, 124. See also Letts Charles v. Soh Kim Wat, [2007] SGHC 202, 48; Re Teoh 
Beng Hock, [2010] 1 MLJ 715, 56. 
19 See, e.g., Siyuan, supra note 9, 562–563; PINSLER, supra note 10, 86–87. 
 
 
evidence.20 The two principal touchstones (if not the only two touchstones) for admitting 
evidence under the EA are: relevancy and reliability.21 The most recent jurisprudence of 
Singapore’s courts has also hinted strongly at this.22 With respect to relevance, the EA makes 
this abundantly clear: Part I is entitled “Relevancy of Facts” and its “more than 50” sections 
constitute almost a third of the statute. Part I essentially reflects the bold attempt by Stephen 
to categorically list and define all types of admissible evidence, as he had found the common 
law rules in the 1800s to be confusing.23 However,  while the EA’s conceptualisation of 
relevance has been greatly lauded even by contemporary scholars,24 it differs from the 
modern common law position in jurisdictions such as England in no less than two material 
respects: first, the EA does not distinguish between relevance and admissibility (it only 
considers the question of legal and not logical relevance); and second, it establishes relevance 
in the form of inclusionary, rather than exclusionary rules (thus, admissibility is determined 
solely by relevance and reliability rather than the consideration of exceptions to common law 
exclusionary rules or other statutory requirements).25  
 
The consequence of this is that the modern common law and the EA have – 
quantitatively and qualitatively – different filters when determining questions of 
admissibility, notwithstanding the possibility that the same results may be yielded from time 
to time for certain pieces of evidence. Specifically, under the modern common law approach, 
admissibility is determined by the following set of questions: is the evidence (logically) 
relevant; is the evidence subject to any applicable (legal) exclusionary rule; does the evidence 
fall within a recognised (legal) exception to the applicable exclusionary rule; and is there 
nonetheless judicial discretion to exclude the evidence?26  
 
Under the EA, up until the 2012 amendments (which, it should be borne in 
mind, only seems to have changed the admissibility paradigm for hearsay and expert opinion 
evidence and not similar fact evidence), there was only one question to be asked in 
determining admissibility: is the evidence relevant as defined by the EA and also reliable 
(reliability being the principle that guides the rules of relevance)?27 If the answer is in the 
affirmative, then the evidence is admissible; there is no discretion to exclude the evidence (or 
the issue simply does not arise). This is consistent with Stephen’s intention to greatly 
simplify the admissibility process. However, as a protective measure that was and still is 
                                                 
20 One of these features – § 2(2)  has already been touched upon. 
21 Siyuan, supra note 13, 416–420; Siyuan, supra note 14, 15–16; Chen Siyuan and Nicholas Poon, Reliability 
and Relevance as the Touchstones for Admissibility of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 24(2) SACLJ 545–
551 (2012). 
22 Id. 
23 PINSLER, supra note 10, 28–29; Robert Margolis, The Concept of Relevance: In the Evidence Act and the 
Modern View, 11 SING L. REV. 24–27 (1990). 
24 See, e.g., ROBERTS & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 5, 100–101; TAPPER, supra note 7, 65–66. C.f. ADRIAN 
KEANE, JAMES GRIFFITHS AND PAUL MCKEOWN, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 20–21 (2010). 
25 TAPPER, supra note 7, 65–66; Siyuan, supra note 14, 6–9; Vinodh Choomaraswamy, Report of the Law 
Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) 7–9, available at 
http://www.sal.org.sg/digitallibrary/Lists/Law%20Reform%20Reports/Attachments/34/01%20LRC%20on%20
Opinion%20Evidence%20%28FINAL%29.pdf (Last visited on February 14, 2014). See also Margolis, supra 
note 23, 28–40. 
26 Siyuan, supra note 14, 7, 12–13; ROBERTS & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 5, 99. See also Australia’s Evidence 
Act, 1995, Introductory Note of Chapter 3. 
27 Siyuan, supra note 14, 15–16; Siyuan, supra note 13, 416–420; Siyuan and Poon, supra note 21, 545–551. 
Hock Lai, supra note 10, 368–370; Philip Jeyaretnam et al, Report of the Law Reform Committee on Reform of 
Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence in Civil Proceedings (May 2007) 8–9, available at 
https://app.agc.gov.sg/DATA/0/Docs/PublicationFiles/LRC_Report_(May_2007).pdf  (Last visited on February 
14, 2014). 
 
 
often carried out in practice, less or virtually no weight can be attached to the admitted 
evidence if there is some eventual suspicion as to its reliability; this exercise is usually done 
after the fact-finder – trial judges, and not juries, in the case of Singapore – have had the 
opportunity to examine the evidentiary record as a whole.28  
 
These differences between the approaches of the modern common law and the 
EA in and of themselves would necessarily have had a significant trickle-down effect as to 
how the similar fact rule should have been formulated and interpreted by the Singapore 
courts. This will be considered soon enough – but suffice to say for now these differences are 
further accentuated by the EA’s bifurcation of its relevancy provisions into general categories 
(§§ 6–11) and specific categories (§§ 12–57).29 Whereas the specific relevancy provisions 
were meant to be codifications of exceptions to common law exclusionary rules, the purpose 
– and therefore usage – of the general relevancy provisions has never been all that clear. 
 
To illustrate, the aforementioned § 11 is an example of a general relevancy 
provision, while §§ 14 and 15 are examples of specific relevancy provisions. The conundrum 
that emerges is whether a piece of evidence needs to satisfy both the general and specific 
relevancy provisions to be admissible: if the answer is in the affirmative, there is nothing on 
the face of the EA to suggest this is actually necessary;30 yet if the answer is in the negative , 
then one potential result is that the specific relevancy provisions would be completely otiose 
as the general relevancy provisions are arguably worded broadly enough to fully encompass 
the specific relevancy provisions and to have them subsumed.31 Indeed, even if one argues 
that evidence caught by traditional exclusionary rules must satisfy at least the corresponding 
specific relevancy provision(s) in the EA, this is still an unsatisfactory compromise as the 
ever-evolving common law has demonstrated that the basis on which evidence can be 
excluded is never static (but the specific relevancy provisions are).32 
 
The judicial decisions in Singapore on this issue have unfortunately been 
inconsistent,33 and in the context of the similar fact rule, the boundary between the two 
categories of relevance in the EA has effectively been eroded by cases that have decided that 
the actus reus aspect of the rule is captured by § 11 (a general relevancy provision), but the 
                                                 
28 Id; Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Report, Volume 88, February 14, 2012, available at 
http://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic.jsp?currentTopicID=00076883-WA&currentPubID=00076904-
WA&topicKey=00076904-WA.00076883-WA_3%2Bid-6e0461e8-8588-49d0-b05e-fc6c2d596955%2B (Last 
visited on February 14, 2014). C.f. Jeffrey Pinsler, Admissibility and the Discretion to Exclude Evidence: In 
Search of a Systematic Approach, 25(1) SAcLJ 223–224 (2013); SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, AN 
INTRODUCTION ON THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 53–54 (1872):  
“The rule, therefore, that facts may be regarded as relevant which can be shown to stand either 
in the relation of cause or in the relation of effect to the fact to which they are said to be 
relevant, may be accepted as true, subject to the caution that, when an inference is to be 
founded upon the existence of such a connection, every step by which the connection is made 
out must either be proved, or be so probable under the circumstances of the case that it may be 
presumed without proof.”  
29 PINSLER, supra note 10, 35–43. 
30 C.f. id., 40–41. 
31 Siyuan, supra note 14, 9–10. See also Hock Lai, supra note 10, 195. 
32 Siyuan, supra note 13, 404–405. 
33 Siyuan, supra note 14, 9; PINSLER, supra note 10, 41–43 and 75–77. For instance, it is often thought (and 
supported by case law) that  §6 reflects the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, but § 6 is a general 
relevancy provision. Accordingly, the argument that evidence captured by a common law exclusionary rule 
must fulfil at least a specific relevancy provision for it to be admissible is weakened. 
 
 
mens rea aspect is captured by §§ 14 and 15 (specific relevancy provisions).34 We turn then 
to examine one of the most important, and indeed, representative similar fact rule cases that 
demonstrate the courts’ reluctance to interpret the EA in its proper terms.  
 
B. UNSATISFACTORY STATE OF JURISPRUDENCE EXEMPLIFIED  
 
Lee Kwang Peng v. Public Prosecutor (‘Lee Kwang Peng’) is often cited as 
the leading case for, inter alia, using § 11 for the purposes of the similar fact rule. This case 
was a High Court decision that involved allegations of a taekwondo instructor outraging the 
modesty of two teenage male students. The instructor was accused of fondling the students’ 
genitals on separate occasions when he was alone with them. A question arose as to whether 
witness testimonies that alluded to the appellant’s alleged acts of molestation on another 
student (who did not form the subject of the charges) would pass muster under the similar 
fact rule. In this regard, the court, in admitting the evidence, stated: 
  
“[B]efore a judge may consider a similar fact relevant by virtue of § 14 or § 
15, that fact must first satisfy the test for the admissibility of similar fact 
evidence … namely, that the probative value of the evidence must exceed its 
prejudicial effect … [however] the similar facts recounted by [the witnesses] 
did not establish the appellant’s mens rea but only the actus reus of the 
offences charged. The similar facts thus did not qualify for inclusion under §§ 
14 and 15 … As §§ 14 and 15 contemplate the inclusion of certain similar 
facts, other similar facts must also be admitted under a provision of the [EA]. 
If similar facts were admitted other than under one of the relevancy 
provisions, it would make a mockery of the [EA] and extend the ambit of the 
similar fact rule beyond the extent intended by the Legislature. A … solution 
would be to declare that such facts would be relevant by virtue of § 11(b) … 
The principal difficulty with this approach is that to construe § 11(b) in such a 
manner is at odds with the draftsman’s commentary … However … I do not 
think it appropriate to sustain an artificial distinction between similar facts 
which are probative of intention (or other states of mind) and similar facts 
which are probative of acts done by the accused, nor do I consider such a 
distinction to have been intended by Parliament.”35 
 
Lee Kwang Peng has since attracted a number of academic responses, all of 
which doubt the correctness of this aspect of the decision, albeit for various reasons.36 As 
already mentioned, the use of a general relevancy provision to admit evidence that 
traditionally falls under an exclusionary rule (exceptions to which are caught by the specific 
relevancy provisions) is not without problems.37 In addition, whereas §§ 14 and 15 trigger the 
operation of § 122 of the EA, § 11(b) does not, thus suggesting that § 11(b) is not meant to be 
used in conjunction with §§ 14 and 15, at least not for the purposes of admitting similar fact 
                                                 
34 Siyuan, supra note 14., 10; Jeffrey Pinsler, Approaches to the Evidence Act: The Judicial Development of a 
Code, 14(2) SAcLJ 382–384 (2012). 
35 Lee Kwang Peng v. Public Prosecutor, (1997) 2 SLR(R) 569, 38, 41–46. Notably, just prior to Lee Kwang 
Peng, the Court of Appeal had pondered about whether the similar fact rule was captured by other provisions in 
the EA, but chose not to elaborate on it as it was not in issue before that case, See Tan Meng Jee v. Public 
Prosecutor, [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178, 36–40 . 
36 See, e.g., Siyuan, supra note 9, 562–563; PINSLER, supra note 10, 75–87; Hock Lai, supra note 10, 190–192; 
195–198. The case has been cited in subsequent jurisprudence, but not for the part pertaining to § 11(b). 
37 Singapore also appears to be the only known Indian Evidence Act jurisdiction that has interpreted § 11(b) in 
the way Lee Kwang Peng v. Public Prosecutor has. 
 
 
evidence. To these ends, the 2012 amendments should have done something about this 
contradiction as it affects not only the similar fact rule but evidence admissible under the EA 
generally. But perhaps the greater and more important difficulty with Lee Kwang Peng is its 
additional claim that § 11(b) of the EA, like §§ 14 and 15, is completely compatible with the 
modern common law concept of balancing probative value and prejudicial effect, and § 2(2) 
poses no barrier whatsoever.38 More precisely, according to Lee Kwang Peng, a judge is 
supposed to apply this balancing test before considering §§ 11(b), 14, or 15 of the EA when it 
comes to ascertaining the admissibility of similar fact evidence. 
 
In this regard, one would recall that under the modern common law paradigm 
of admissibility of evidence, there are essentially four questions to be asked – the concept of 
balancing probative value and prejudicial effect is the test used to answer the fourth question 
of whether a court has discretion to exclude relevant evidence.39 The genesis of the 
application of this balancing test specifically to similar fact evidence can popularly be traced 
to the House of Lords decision of Boardman v. Director of Public Prosecutions 
(‘Boardman’),40 a case involving a boarding school headmaster accused of committing 
buggery with young students. At issue was whether evidence on one charge to corroborate 
evidence in respect of the other charge was correctly admitted at trial. 
 
Lord Wilberforce opined that “there is no general or automatic answer to be 
given to the question whether evidence of facts similar to those the subject of a particular 
charge ought to be admitted. In each case it is necessary to estimate … whether … the 
evidence as to other facts tends to support [and] whether such evidence, if given, is likely to 
be prejudicial to the accused.”41 Boardman in effect superseded the Privy Council decision of 
Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales (‘Makin’),42 a case involving a couple 
accused of murdering a child. At issue was whether evidence of other babies buried in 
backyards of their previous residences was admissible. Lord Herschell had opined that 
similar fact evidence is inadmissible if adduced merely to show propensity to commit a 
crime, but may be admissible if it is relevant to disproving intent or to rebut a defence 
otherwise open to the accused.43  
 
But is either Makin or Boardman consistent with §§ 14 and 15 of the EA? The 
following view is particularly instructive: 
 
“[W]hereas in a number of English cases propensity evidence was admitted 
via the second limb of the Makin rule, this approach is not possible under §§ 
14 and 15 because of the scope of these provisions does not extend to the 
rebuttal of “any defence” raised by the accused. The result is that even 
extremely probative evidence which virtually confirms that the accused 
committed the offence charged will not be admissible because actus reus is 
                                                 
38 Lee Kwang Peng v. Public Prosecutor, (1997) 2 SLR(R) 569, 43.  
39 ROBERTS AND ZUCKERMAN, supra note 5, 99; TAPPER, supra note 7, 191–192; KEANE, GRIFFITHS AND 
MCKEOWN supra note 24, 44–46. 
40 [1975] AC 421.  
41 Id., 442. It should be noted that while it is true that the subsequent House of Lords decision in Director of 
Public Prosecutions v. P, [1991] 2 AC 447 clarified that there need not be any striking similarity in the facts 
before the evidence can be considered admissible, it did not change Lord Wilberforce’s formulation of the 
balancing test. The balancing test also famously reared its head again in R v. Sang, [1980] AC 402, a case 
involving entrapment . 
42 [1894] AC 64. 
43 Id., 65. 
 
 
excluded from the ambit of those sections … whereas Boardman lays 
emphasis on the degree of probity of evidence irrespective of the purposes for 
which that evidence is adduced, §§ 14 and 15 assume that evidence will only 
be sufficiently probative if it comes within one or other of the fixed categories. 
Thus, whereas evidence of propensity to prove the commission of the crime 
would be admissible under the Boardman formulation, if sufficiently 
probative, such evidence is not so regarded by §§ 14 and 15 because the 
purpose for which it is adduced is outside the scope of those sections. 
Secondly, whereas the consideration of the prejudicial effect of the evidence is 
a vital aspect of the Boardman approach, it plays no part in the determination 
of admissibility under the sections …”44 
 
This view is arguably fortified by a  High Court decision in 2011 that 
remarked, in obiter, that the admissibility of similar fact evidence has to be determined 
according to the categories of relevance under §§ 14 and 15 of the EA and there can be no 
exclusion of similar fact evidence that is otherwise deemed relevant under those provisions.45 
However, these remarks have yet to be endorsed by the Court of Appeal, and while Lee 
Kwang Peng was also a High Court decision, it had followed a Court of Appeal decision (Tan 
Meng Jee) with regard to the claim that the balancing test is consistent with §§ 14 and 15.46 
In short, Lee Kwang Peng remains good law, and nothing in the 2012 amendments to the EA 
has changed that. 
 
Having suggested that the balancing test cannot be said to be compatible with 
§§ 14 and 15 of the EA47 (and therefore Lee Kwang Peng should not be considered correct in 
view of § 2(2)), what about § 11(b), notwithstanding its classification as a general relevancy 
provision? Although it may be argued that the phrase “highly probable or improbable” is 
                                                 
44 PINSLER, supra note 10, 79 and 81.  
45 Public Prosecutor v. Mas Swan bin Adnan, [2011] SGHC 107, 107. It should be noted that even though 
Boardman has arguably been superseded by legislation (Criminal Justice Act, 2003) in England for some time 
already, the Court did not discuss such legislation in its decision. 
46 Lee Kwang Peng v. Public Prosecutor, (1997) 2 SLR(R) 569, 37–40; Tan Meng Jee v. Public Prosecutor, 
(1996) 2 SLR(R) 178, 48–49: 
“[T]he admission of similar fact evidence, at least for the purposes identified in ss 14 and 15 
… should be governed by the balancing test adopted by [Boardman]. Such an approach is 
warranted both in principle as well as on the wording of the legislation itself … the rationale 
of the rule excluding similar fact evidence is so that every person charged with an offence may 
only be convicted upon being proved to have committed the acts within the charge. It would 
be subverting established jurisprudence to allow conviction based on the particular disposition 
of the accused … On the other hand, there may be cases where the interest of justice clearly 
outweigh any prejudicial dangers inherent in the evidence. No doubt, in this jurisdiction, the 
trial judge being the trier of fact will have to be familiar with the similar facts in order to rule 
as to its relevance. However, we think ingenuous the argument that a strict enforcement of the 
similar fact rule is futile if the evidence has already been allowed to infiltrate the mind of the 
trial judge. All we say in response is that we are far more confident in the ability of judges to 
disregard prejudicial evidence when the need arises … While the plain wording of the 
Evidence Act does seem to adopt a categorisation approach to similar fact evidence … at least 
where the similar facts are being adduced to prove one of the matters identified in ss 14 and 
15, a balancing process must take place.” 
47 While it is true that Malaysia – which has a highly identical EA to Singapore – has adopted the position in 
Tan Meng Jee as regards the balancing test (see, e.g., Al Bakhtiar bin Ab Samat v. Public Prosecutor, [2012] 4 
MLJ 713, 30), they do not have the equivalent of  § 2(2) and therefore have greater flexibility in developing 
their common law. Moreover, there appears to be nothing in Indian commentaries that suggests the balancing 
test is part of, or consistent with, the Indian equivalents of  §§ 14 and 15. see, .e.g, VR MANOHAR, supra note 
14, 148–159. 
 
 
similar to (and therefore consistent with) the idea of probative value, there is no phrase in § 
11(b) that is similar to the idea of prejudicial effect. It may be plausible, of course, to argue 
that the concept of prejudicial effect is implied in § 11(b), in that “if a fact makes the fact in 
issue ‘highly probable’, the prejudicial effect of that fact will correspondingly be lowered.”48 
However, this line of reasoning has been disputed before, given that probative value and 
prejudicial effect are not necessarily always on opposite ends of a scale; the requirement of 
‘highly’ is not found in the Boardman test; § 11(b) has not been applied in the context of 
other exclusionary rules;49 § 11(b) is expressed in inclusionary and not exclusionary terms; 
and if § 11(b) were to be resorted to, what objection is there against it to be used for the mens 
rea aspect of the similar fact rule as well (thereby rendering the specific relevancy provisions 
otiose)?50 In any event, there is a bigger reason why the similar fact rule in Singapore cannot 
remain as it is: the 2012 amendments to the EA and the misguided introduction of the concept 
of exclusionary discretion. 
 
C. MISGUIDED INTRODUCTION OF DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE IN THE 2012 
AMENDMENTS 
 
1. Internal Inconsistencies 
 
Before the 2012 amendments to the EA, there was nothing in the statute that 
conferred on the courts discretion to exclude evidence once it had been found admissible 
under the EA, though as seen above this did not stop the Singapore courts from interpreting 
that this discretion could be exercised for similar fact evidence.51 The 2012 amendments 
changed this – but, as one would recall, supposedly only with respect to two provisions 
relating to hearsay and expert opinion evidence.  
 
First, § 32(3) was introduced, and it states that while a statement by a person 
who is dead or cannot be found (thus a hearsay statement) may be relevant, it “shall not be 
relevant if the court is of the view that it would not be in the interests of justice to treat it as 
relevant.” Second, § 47 was expanded to include a new sub-section (4), and it states in the 
same terms that while an expert opinion that may render assistance to a court is a relevant 
fact, it “shall not be relevant if the court is of the view that it would not be in the interests of 
justice to treat it as relevant.”52  
 
                                                 
48 PINSLER, supra note 10, 81. 
49 See infra note 60. 
50 Hock Lai, supra note 10, 167; Hor, supra note 11, 49–52; Siyuan, supra note 13, 408–409. In fact, one could 
make a case for using § 8(1) (another general relevancy provision) as well: “Any fact is relevant which shows or 
constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.” 
51 See also Muhammad bin Kadar v. Public Prosecutor, [2011] 3 SLR 1205, 42–67, where the Court of Appeal 
held that it had discretion to exclude an accused’s procedurally irregular statements on the basis of the balancing 
test. Although statements generally do not fall under the EA, as will be explained, the application of the 
balancing test in Singapore needs to be more properly considered. C.f. SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A 
DIGEST ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1881), Art. 2: “Evidence may be given in any proceeding of any fact in 
issue, and of any fact relevant to any fact in issue unless it is hereinafter declared to be deemed irrelevant, and of 
any fact hereinafter declared to be deemed to be relevant to the issue whether it is or is not relevant thereto. 
Provided that the judge may exclude evidence of facts which, though relevant or deemed to be relevant to the 
issue, appear to him too remote to be material under all circumstances of the case.” 
52 Parenthetically, one would notice that these two particular amendments confirm that the EA indeed does not 
distinguish between relevance and admissibility.  See also Siyuan,  supra note 14, 8–9; Pinsler, supra note 28, 
235. 
 
 
There is a litany of problems with these two seemingly simple amendments 
that were meant to narrow the admissibility of hearsay and expert opinion evidence (having 
expanded their scope of admissibility through other aspects of the amendments).53 The most 
obvious problem for present purposes is that first, this exclusionary discretion has not been 
extended to the similar fact rule provisions found in §§ 14 and 15 of the EA. The simple 
explanation (but by no means legitimate justification) for this is that Ministry of Law – the 
body that had spearheaded the consultation processes leading up to the 2012 amendments – 
had not contemplated amending the provisions on similar fact as it had only proposed to 
amend the provisions on legal professional privilege, expert opinion, computer output, 
hearsay, and impeachment of rape victims.54  
 
Regardless of the acceptability of this reason, limiting the exclusionary 
discretion to the hearsay and expert opinion evidence provisions would, on basic statutory 
interpretation principles,55 suggest that such discretion is not available when it comes to 
similar fact evidence and/or other relevancy provisions in the EA.56 Oddly, Parliament was 
fully aware of this as a problem (a Member of Parliament had raised this during the second 
reading of the bill amending the EA), but decided to leave the amendments as it were.57 To 
be clear, however, the point here is not that the exclusionary discretion should have been 
extended to all exceptions to the exclusionary rules captured by their corresponding specific 
relevancy provisions in the EA, but rather, the EA has now become even more internally 
inconsistent and structurally fractured after the amendments.  
 
The second problem with the introduction of exclusionary discretion is that 
Parliament had pressed ahead with the amendments despite various fundamental self-
contradictions being expressed when the bill was debated. To cite one example, on the one 
hand, the Minister for Law stated that under the EA, if a piece of evidence “is irrelevant, as a 
matter of law, it is inadmissible. If it is unreliable, then it should not be admitted. By 
definition, the judge applies the law, irrelevant and unreliable evidence should not be in in the 
first place.”58 These words would suggest that under the EA and in a system like Singapore 
which uses judges as fact-finders, the question of exclusion simply does not and cannot arise. 
If a piece of evidence is irrelevant and/or unreliable, it will not be admitted; if it is admitted, 
its weight can be varied accordingly if necessary. Yet in the very same debate, the Minister 
for Law also said the amendments simply confirm that the courts have always had a “residual 
discretion” to exclude (hearsay and expert opinion) evidence all along; the purported 
                                                 
53 Specifically, the number of hearsay exceptions increased, while the categories of admissibility of expert 
opinion evidence were considerably broadened. 
54 Ministry of Law, “Proposed Amendments to the Evidence Act”, January 16, 2012, available at 
http://www.mlaw.gov.sg/news/press-releases/proposed-amendments-to-the-evidence-act.html (Last visited on 
February 14, 2014). 
55 See, e.g., Highway Video Pte Ltd v. Public Prosecutor, [2001] 3 SLR(R) 830, 26; Mohamed Hisham bin 
Sapandi v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 4 SLR 868, 8. 
56 See also Pinsler, supra note 28, 216–217: 
“The question arises as to whether the limitation of the discretion to exclude evidence within 
the scope of § 32(3) and 47(4) ignores the need for a discretion to exclude evidence 
admissible under other provisions of the EA. Should there be a general discretion to exclude 
in the EA, one that is anchored by broad criteria so that the courts are provided with the 
flexibility to respond appropriately to the particular circumstances of every case? This leads to 
the further consideration of how a discretionary mechanism can effectively operate in 
conjunction with the rules of admissibility and thereby enhance the integrity of the trial 
process.” 
57 Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Report, supra note 28. 
58 Id. 
 
 
justification for this was that the scope of admissibility for hearsay and expert opinion 
evidence would broaden after the amendments, so there needed to be a check against abuse.59  
 
But if the courts already had this exclusionary discretion even before the 
amendments, why would providing for it in the EA now act as a check against abuse? If it 
was acknowledged by Parliament that the EA does not actually contemplate the exclusion of 
any evidence, how would the introduction of a (albeit supposedly pre-existing) residuary 
discretion be consistent with the EA? Moreover, in most if not all other common law 
jurisdictions, the exclusionary discretion (where it exists) can be used in all instances of 
exclusionary rules (and even beyond that) and is not confined to hearsay and expert opinion 
evidence.60 This was probably what the objecting Member of Parliament was alluding to. But 
even if it is assumed that the exclusionary discretion found in §§ 32(3) and 47(4) was 
impliedly intended by Parliament61 to also apply to similar fact evidence, there are other 
problems. 
 
2. Strange Choice of Words for New Test 
 
To begin with, the phrase “in the interests of justice”, which is common to §§ 
32(3) and 47(4), is, in the context of what has been outlined thus far, a strange choice of 
words. As mentioned, the conventional language used in some common law jurisdictions – 
and indeed as adopted in local cases such as Lee Kwang Peng – for the discretion to exclude 
(relevant) evidence involves weighing probative value and prejudicial effect.62 It is not at all 
clear if this new test of “in the interests of justice” is meant to be the same as the weighing 
exercise or to be used in conjunction with it (or, as Lee Kwang Peng has suggested, before 
the application of the relevant provisions in the EA), not to mention that the phrase is so 
broad that it does not add anything to what a court is supposed to do in any given case 
anyway.63 As a commentator recently noted: 
 
“The terminology … does raise conceptual and practical concerns … One 
must assume that the provisions of the EA (indeed, the content of every 
statute) were drafted with a view to the interests of justice. Therefore, as a 
matter of principle, how is it that the court should be entitled to decide that the 
admissibility of facts within the scope of [§§ 32 and 47] would not be in the 
interests of justice … While unreliability may well be a pertinent factor to be 
considered pursuant to §§ 32(3) and 47(4), it is obviously not the only concern 
given the broad context of the terminology “interests of justice” …”64 
 
Unfortunately, the parliamentary debates are also not particularly illuminating, 
although phrases such as “inherent jurisdiction to exclude prejudicial evidence” and 
“probative value of the evidence versus the prejudicial value of the evidence” were used by 
                                                 
59 Id. 
60 Siyuan, supra note 13, 405; Siyuan and Poon, supra note 21, 537; Report of the Law Reform Committee on 
Opinion Evidence, supra note 25, 4–5; R v. Sang, [1980] AC, 402,  452.  
61 It should be noted in this regard that under § 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed), courts are 
obligated to interpret all statutory provisions purposively. 
62 See also Tan Guat Neo Phyllis, supra note 13, 126; Muhammad bin Kadar v. Public Prosecutor, [2011] 3 SLR 
1205, 42–67, 140–147; Pinsler, supra note 28, 225. 
63 Siyuan, supra note 14, 13–14. 
64 Pinsler, supra note 28, 235–236. 
 
 
the Minister for Law when discussing this aspect of the bill.65 In addition, the Law Reform 
Committee that had prepared a report on reforming the expert opinion evidence provisions in 
the EA for Parliament’s consideration was also equivocal as how the court’s exclusionary 
discretion should be formulated and defined.66 Perhaps this should not be surprising, given 
the different statutory approaches taken in different jurisdictions as regards a court’s general 
power to exclude evidence.  
 
For instance, in England and Wales, § 78(1) of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 states:  
 
“In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having 
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an 
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to 
admit it.”  
 
In Australia, § 137 of the Evidence Act 1995 states: “In a criminal proceeding, 
the court must refuse to admit evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” 67 In New Zealand, § 8(1) of 
the Evidence Act 2006 states: “In any proceeding, the Judge must exclude evidence if its 
probative value is outweighed by the risk that the evidence will … have an unfairly 
prejudicial effect on the proceeding; or … needlessly prolong the proceeding.”68 And in the 
United States, § 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: “The court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting 
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 
 
                                                 
65 Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Report, supra note 28. See also Jeffrey Pinsler, Whether a 
Singapore Court has a Discretion to Exclude Evidence Admissible in Criminal Proceedings,22(2) SACLJ 360–
361 (2010): 
“The doctrine of inherent power exists in Singapore … Indeed, the Singapore courts have 
acknowledged their entitlement to exercise their inherent power in criminal cases. As the law 
of evidence is adjectival in nature, and has a fundamental role in the court’s process by 
governing the scope and presentation of information which a court is to rely upon, the court is 
justified in exercising its inherent power to exclude evidence which, if admitted, would cause 
injustice and consequently compromise its process. There is nothing in the EA which excludes 
the application of this doctrine. Section 2(2) [does] not affect the court’s inherent power, 
which is derived independently from the court’s status. Furthermore, s 5 of the EA, the 
governing provision on admissibility, does not compel the court to admit relevant evidence … 
the court would only exercise its inherent power to uphold the aims of the EA by ensuring that 
its rules do not undermine the ultimate purpose of the statute, which is to secure a fair trial.” 
66 Report of the Law Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence, supra note 25, 4–5. The Committee did come 
close to suggest using prejudice and confusion as bases of exclusion, however. 
67 In addition, § 135 states: “The court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger that the evidence might: (a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or (b) be misleading or 
confusing; or (c) cause or result in undue waste of time.” Further, § 136 states: “The Court may limit the use to 
be made of evidence if there is a danger that a particular use of the evidence might: (a) be unfairly prejudicial to 
a party; or (b) be misleading or confusing.” 
68 In addition, § 8(2) states: “In determining whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by the risk 
that the evidence will have an unfairly prejudicial effect on a criminal proceeding, the Judge must take into 
account the right of the defendant to offer an effective defence.” 
 
 
There are thus various ways in which a court’s exclusionary discretion can be 
formulated and justified, and it is not clear if the test of “in the interests of justice” is meant to 
closely emulate any jurisdiction in particular and whether it supersedes or operates in 
conjunction with any existing common law test. To add to the confusion, the Minister for 
Law said during the parliamentary debates that a judge, in deciding whether to admit hearsay 
or expert opinion evidence under the amended EA provisions, “must ask himself whether the 
interests of justice require the admissibility of the evidence in the first place. And if it does, 
what weight will he ascribe to it.” At first blush, this seems consistent with the language of 
§§ 32(3) and 47(4) of the EA, which may give the impression that the provisions are not 
talking about what evidence can be excluded after it is deemed admissible but rather what can 
be admissible in the first place. This will be contended below, but to be sure, there is more 
than a semantic but a practical consequence of distinguishing between what is 
admissible/admitted and what is excludable/excluded. Specifically, if a piece of evidence is 
not part of the evidentiary record at all, the option of weight-assignment is completely 
foreclosed. Further, an appellate court has much less, if not virtually no room to interfere with 
what is not part of the evidentiary record, as fact-finding is not its province.69 It is therefore 
imperative to determine if there is actually such a concept as exclusion (under the EA), and if 
a piece of evidence is even going to be part of the record in the first place (for it will not be if 
it is inadmissible ab initio). 
 
It is unlikely that §§ 32(3) and 47(4) were not meant to introduce an 
exclusionary discretion. As mentioned and as confirmed by Parliament, the admissibility of 
evidence under the EA is determined purely by relevancy and reliability; the existing 
controlling mechanism is weight. Parliament must have intended §§ 32(3) and 47(4) as an 
additional exclusionary discretion independent of the question of admissibility, unless it 
intended the phrase “in the interests of justice” to be a mere reiteration of the admissibility 
criteria of relevance and reliability. This is unlikely, and it should not be assumed that 
Parliament intended to add words to a statutory provision without meaning to alter its 
content. Moreover, Parliament acknowledged that the criteria of relevance and reliability 
apply to all relevancy provisions in the EA,70 so this is another reason why it could not have 
meant the phrase “in the interests of justice” to be a reiteration of those touchstones – “in the 
interests of justice” only appears in and applies to §§ 32(3) and 47(4), and nowhere else.  
 
Proceeding on the basis that Parliament had intended instead to equate the test 
of “in the interests of justice” purely with Boardman’s test of balancing probative value and 
prejudicial effect to exclude (all manner of) admissible evidence, questions have nevertheless 
been raised as to what these terms mean, how the test operates, and whether there is a 
coherent normative justification for the test.71  
 
3. Problems with the Balancing Test 
 
The definitional question of what probative value and prejudicial effect mean 
has never been addressed by the Singapore courts despite their consistent use of the 
Boardman test. The balancing test, being a common law construct, defines probative value as 
                                                 
69 Susilawati v. American Express Bank Ltd., [2009] 2 SLR(R) 737, 51; Lim Koon Park v. Yap Jia Meng Bryan, 
[2013] SGCA 4, 37. 
70 Supra note 58. 
71 As these questions have already been explored in greater detail in three recent commentaries, (see Siyuan, 
supra note 13; Siyuan, supra note 14; Siyuan and Poon, supra note 21) they will only be explored summarily 
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rationally or logically probative, but the EA defines relevance as in legally probative (and 
therefore narrower) terms. This disconnect immediately poses a problem. As for prejudicial 
effect, the point has already been made that its meaning is clearly not confined to a lack of 
probative value or relevance; if that is the case, this affects the operation of the test as well, 
since a balancing exercise presupposes antithetical attributes on opposing ends of the same 
scale.72 Moreover, ‘prejudice’ clearly assumes different meanings in different contexts: for 
instance, for hearsay evidence, it could refer to intrinsic unreliability generally conceived, but 
for similar fact evidence, it could refer to distorting bias. A call to ‘refresh’ the balancing test 
has thus been made in the following terms: 
 
“The probative value/prejudicial effect balancing test evolved in response to 
the danger that the jury might overestimate the probative value of the evidence 
(as in the case of an unrelated previous conviction or other evidence of bad 
character), or that it might react with a moral bias against the accused (because 
of the nature of the offence or the evidence). In this specific context, 
prejudicial effect involves an emotional or irrational response on the part of 
the trier of fact, unjustified by logical reasoning … [However] [s]ituations 
often arise in which the court is not concerned with the effect of evidence and 
resulting prejudice in its orthodox sense, but with other countervailing factors 
that demand the exclusion of the evidence … The probative value/prejudicial 
effect balancing test did not emerge from a developed legal principle but from 
a longstanding practice of the courts to prevent injustice resulting from 
admissible evidence to which the jury might accord a degree of weight out of 
all proportion to its actual probative value … the optimal approach would be 
to balance the significance of the evidence (its probative value or importance 
to one or more of the issues) against any factors that militate against its 
admission … admissible evidence may be excluded if it does not justify the 
disadvantages that would result from its admission. These would include 
additional costs … delay in the proceedings … the distraction of the court 
and/or the parties … its tendency to confuse or its misleading effect … lack of 
reliability … and prejudice (in the sense of evidence that would have the effect 
of being substantively unjust or procedurally oppressive). Clearly, the less 
significant or probative the statement, the less forceful the countervailing 
factors would need to be to justify exclusion.”73 
 
But there are still problems with this modified approach. For instance, there 
will be occasions where the probative value of a piece of evidence can only be ascertained 
after it is seen in  proper  light and context of the entire evidentiary record; what may initially 
be characterised as tangential or irrelevant may turn out to be relevant and crucial evidence. 
Thus, similar fact evidence, in spite of their apparent prejudicial effect, have been admitted in 
certain cases for the purpose of establishing background and context.74 Indeed, as Singapore 
has long abolished the jury system, this has led the Court of Appeal to opine (perhaps not 
coincidentally, in a similar fact decision) that “the wrongful admission of evidence of bad 
character or disposition of the accused does not necessarily mean that the judge or judges 
                                                 
72 See also Siyuan, supra note 13, 407–409; Siyuan and Poon, supra note 21, 538–541; HO HOCK LAI, A 
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73 Pinsler, supra note 28, 225–226 and 236–237. 
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have been adversely influenced by such evidence. We must bear in mind that judges are 
trained to assess evidence objectively and to sift the wheat from the chaff.”75  
 
In other words, without a jury to shield and with trial judges who are 
purportedly professionally trained to be immune to the effects of so-called prejudicial 
evidence, there is a lesser need in the Singapore criminal justice system for the fact-finder to 
individually consider the probative value or prejudicial effect of each piece of evidence at the 
admissibility stage – after all, the trial judge has the option to assign the appropriate weight to 
the evidence in question before making his judgment (and where written judgments are 
rendered, this is usually explained). However, there will be occasions where a piece of 
evidence may not be amenable to weight-assignment but has to be rejected completely for 
consideration of admissibility for epistemic reasons. In the passage cited above, it was 
suggested that substantive injustice or procedural oppression may be a possible ground to do 
so. Indeed, the Court of Appeal recently suggested (in a non-EA context) that where the 
procedural requirements in the recording of statements have been flagrantly violated, the 
court ought to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to exclude the (relevant) evidence so as to, 
inter alia, prevent injustice at trial.76 
 
These references to inherent jurisdiction and prevention of injustice at trial 
should immediately bring to mind the test of “in the interests of justice” introduced in §§ 
32(3) and 47(4) of the EA: one would recall that the term “inherent jurisdiction” was used by 
the Minister for Law to describe the basis of the test when the bill amending the EA was 
debated, while it would also be reasonable to assume that “in the interests of justice” is 
similar to the concept of prevention of injustice. In this connection, whereas the Singapore 
courts have seen fit to tap into their inherent powers77 in the civil realm (or simply to discuss 
them without invocation) from time to time, they have hardly done so in the criminal realm.78 
Notably, the justification for invoking inherent powers in the civil realm is a consistent one: 
the court is the master of its own process, and therefore it can make certain orders pursuant to 
its residual inherent powers (that is, powers that are independent of any statutory conferral) to 
prevent an abuse of its process and to preserve its moral legitimacy as a tribunal.79 Is this 
concept of a court exercising its inherent powers to regulate the civil process transposable to 
the criminal realm?  
                                                 
75 Wong Kim Poh v. Public Prosecutor, [1992] 1 SLR(R) 13, 14. See also Chan Sek Keong, The Criminal 
Process – The Singapore Model, 17 SING. L. REV. 456 (1996); VR MANOHAR, supra note 14, 2; Attorney-
General of Hong Kong v. Siu Yuk-Shing, [1989] 1 WLR 236, 241. It should be noted that while the EA was 
based on late-19th-century English rules of evidence – or rules that would have made more sense for jury trials – 
Stephen preferred the Indian Evidence Act to be used for bench trials. 
76 Muhammad bin Kadar v. Public Prosecutor, [2011] 3 SLR 1205, 42–67,52–53. In a somewhat related vein, 
the Court of Appeal in Teo Wai Cheong v. Crédit Industriel et Commercial, [2013] SGCA 33 also suggested 
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In principle, there should be no serious objection, since generally speaking 
greater rights and liberties are at stake in prosecutions, and the court is meant to be (within 
limits) a guardian of such rights and liberties.80 Be that as it may, the very nature of inherent 
powers means that they can only be invoked in exceptional and narrowly defined 
circumstances, even in the criminal realm. These circumstances may not lend themselves 
readily to statutory elaboration, but the broad phrase “in the interests of justice” in §§ 32(3) 
and 47(4) of the EA seems immediately at odds with the idea of exceptional and narrowly 
defined inherent powers.81 If so, the prevention of injustice – assumed here to mean the same 
as “in the interests of justice” – is also conceptually wider than the exercise of inherent 
powers. Moreover, while it may appear that the prevention of injustice has been used as a 
justification to exclude evidence in other jurisdictions,82 there are two important nuances to 
note.  
 
First, the actual justification identified in these cases is more specific than 
prevention of injustice – it is that of prevention of abuse of process. The semantic difference 
is not insignificant, as the concept of injustice has more than a procedural dimension to it. It 
has a potential substantive dimension to it as well. Second and more importantly, such a 
justification has been applied, inter alia, in the context of so-called entrapment evidence. 
However, in Singapore, such evidence has been ruled to be admissible – ironically, on the 
basis that the probative value of entrapment evidence will always exceed its prejudicial effect 
– and neither will its admissibility amount to an abuse of process.83 If the balancing test is 
normatively rationalised on the basis of prevention of abuse of process, then by parity of 
reasoning the local cases on entrapment must be considered wrong. All things considered, it 
seems that neither the balancing test nor the concept of invoking inherent powers is helpful in 
understanding what “in the interests of justice” means.  
 
III. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
A. INTRINSIC DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY THE EA 
 
It should be clear by now that the EA is a complex and nuanced statute, and 
any attempt to amend it in an ad hoc fashion will always be fraught with difficulty. As a 
commentator once presciently forewarned: 
 
“A number of the 19th century rules [of evidence] were shown to be based on 
falsifiable psychological assumptions, dubious epistemic premises or outdated 
political or social mores: these were modified, overruled or repealed not just 
by judicial decision alone but also by legislation in other jurisdictions. 
However, the changes in the law of evidence here have been few and far 
between, and through judicial decision rather than legislation, though civil 
procedure law has undergone several important institutional changes. With 
whatever few changes that were made, the code resembles very much an 
historic artefact preserving much of its structure, but with new additions by 
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different artisans showing little concern for connectivity to the design and 
purpose of the original legislation. A holistic view of the whole enterprise is 
missing, making the task of judges and lawyers in understanding and 
interpreting it and raising the question whether the [EA] – this statutory icon – 
should remain standing or be deconstructed and remade. Both internal and 
external incoherence exists in the current code, which requires attention.”84  
 
Indeed, the 2012 amendments to the EA amply demonstrate Parliament’s 
piecemeal approach towards modernising the EA, with little or maybe even no appreciation 
of the statute’s unique conceptualisation of relevance. It would also not be fanciful to suggest 
that the amendments could have been largely (but certainly not exclusively) motivated by the 
use of hearsay and expert opinion evidence in civil and commercial, rather than criminal 
matters.85 To a limited extent this mirrors developments elsewhere in the world as regards 
civil and commercial matters: the traditional prohibitions against hearsay evidence have 
largely been relaxed or even abolished, and while there have been attempts to better regulate 
its admissibility (with the main aim of saving costs), expert opinion evidence is increasingly 
thought to be valuable to the court, especially in certain scientific and esoteric fields.86  
 
Such developments have been possible, in no small part due to the recognition 
that in civil and commercial litigation, greater inter-party autonomy can be afforded as 
equality between private parties is (often rightly) assumed. This is, however, less possible 
(and desirable) in criminal matters, where the state often stands in a far superior position vis-
à-vis the accused person in terms of resources and possession of evidence. Further, whereas 
some jurisdictions have created separate evidence legislation for civil and criminal matters, in 
Singapore, the EA applies to both types of proceedings. Combined with the unique features 
of the EA (its use of legal rather than logical relevance; the distinction between general and 
                                                 
84 Yung, supra note 6, 53–54. 
85 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Report, supra note 28: 
“Ms Sylvia Lim raised her fundamental point … that by harmonising civil and criminal cases 
for the hearsay exception rules to both civil and criminal cases, are we taking it too far, would 
evidence which is prejudicial to the accused now be admissible, and would that weaken 
supposedly the administration of justice and lead to … convictions which should not have 
been made in the interests of justice … I have made the point that there are contrasting 
arguments around the world as to whether we should have the hearsay rules or, in fact, abolish 
them altogether … There is a strong argument to say that all relevant evidence should be 
presented to a court … the hearsay rules and other such exclusionary rules really developed in 
the context of jury trials … it is really an assessment of the probative value of the evidence 
versus the prejudicial value of the evidence ... The black-and-white approach that should be 
taken is to the fundamental principle that the judge must at the end of the day be satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused, and we should set out clearly what the 
law disapproves of, which is evidence obtained by coercion and various categories which the 
law has set out. But when it comes to issues like hearsay, then there is the question of a 
judgment call. The structure we have put up is that we have set up some safeguards. We also 
give the overriding jurisdiction to the courts to exclude evidence, both in civil and criminal 
cases ... And do not forget that, even if the evidence is allowed in, there is the question of 
weight.” 
It is probably no coincidence that the other amendment that received great attention was that of legal 
professional privilege – which has a far greater synonymy with the commercial context. And perhaps another 
reason why the similar fact rule provisions were left intact is that the rule has a much greater synonymy with 
criminal, rather than civil matters. See also Pinsler, supra note 28, 216–217 and 242. 
86 ROBERTS AND ZUCKERMAN, supra note 5, 364–365, 502; TAPPER, supra note 7, 542–547, 586; KEANE, 
GRIFFITHS AND MCKEOWN, supra note 24, 322–323, 525–526. 
 
 
specific relevance; and § 2(2)),87 any attempt to amend the EA, particularly with regard to its 
relevancy provisions, is an extremely difficult task. 
 
In light of the aforementioned challenges, what are the possible ways forward 
for the EA in general and the similar fact rule in particular? In this paper, the following 
problems were identified. First, the 2012 amendments, in upending the admissibility 
paradigm of the EA, did not reflect any understanding of the three most fundamental features 
of the statute: the restriction in importing common law developments by virtue of § 2(2); the 
use of legal rather than logical relevance; and the distinction drawn between specific and 
general relevancy. The interpretation of all relevancy provisions in the EA, including those 
on similar fact, has been thrown into disarray. Second, no reason was given as to why only 
the hearsay and expert opinion evidence provisions were amended, but not the provisions on 
the similar fact rule. A possible explanation is that Parliament was mainly concerned about 
evidence frequently used in civil and commercial matters, though it was aware that the EA 
applied to criminal matters as well. Third, the jurisprudence interpreting the similar fact rule 
provisions in the EA was riddled with doubt and inconsistency, and the amendments 
represent a missed opportunity to rectify this. Instead, §§ 32(3) and 47(4) may have changed 
the admissibility paradigm for the similar evidence without the Parliament knowing it. 
Fourth, the statutory introduction of the judicial discretion to exclude relevant evidence, 
regardless of whether it is assumed to apply to other relevancy provisions as well, has not 
been well thought-out, particularly with respect to the overly broad test of “in the interests of 
justice”. Ironically, this test may well be the same as the one in Boardman – a case involving 
similar fact. 
 
B. POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD 
 
Given the battered shape that it is in now, it is tempting to advocate for the 
complete repeal of the EA. Iconic as it is for a piece of legislation, it has not kept pace with 
modern common law developments even after several rounds of amendments staggered over 
the decades – the most recent of which has even made it more incoherent than before. 
However, pragmatically speaking, it will probably be deemed politically counterproductive to 
repeal the EA so soon after it was amended (which was also done after the solicitation of a 
wide range of views over more than a decade).88 It is also unlikely that a new EA will be 
created anytime soon, if the recently reintroduced Criminal Procedure Code89 is anything to 
go by.90 Indeed, the parting words from the Minister for Law before the bill was passed in 
Parliament were to take a wait-and-see approach to see how the courts deals with the 
amended provisions, so it seems one should not hope for the Criminal Procedure Code to be 
expanded to become the sole regulator of the admissibility of criminal evidence either.91 In 
the circumstances one is minded to conclude that since the EA is only likely to be amenable 
to (more) piecemeal changes in the near future, that is all that one should hope and strive for. 
At the same time, however, the EA is in desperate need of proper reform, given the yawning 
disconnects between its conceptualisation of relevance and modern judicial and statutory 
responses to evidential issues. In light of this, perhaps the following recommendations, which 
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88 Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Report, supra note 28. 
89 Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed. 
90 JENNIFER MARIE, THE JOURNEY FROM CONCEPTION TO FRUITION TOOK TWO DECADES: THE CRIMINAL 
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would apply as the EA currently does to both civil and criminal proceedings, can be briefly 
considered (that is, assuming that neither the EA is repealed nor a new criminal evidence 
statute is created).  
 
First, § 2(2) has outstayed its welcome and should be removed. Other Indian 
Evidence Act jurisdictions which had similar provisions have not kept them,92 and it is not 
difficult to see why: it no longer serves its original purpose, and in getting around it courts 
have distorted the provisions and structure of the EA beyond recognition so as to 
accommodate modern developments in evidence law. There may be a fear that repealing § 
2(2) will give courts carte blanche to cite and apply foreign sources of law in an unprincipled 
manner, but this has never been a real problem in other statutory contexts devoid of § 2(2)-
type provisions, not least because statutory law is already by definition a superior source of 
law to case law. As Singapore continues to develop its autochthonous legal system in all 
facets of the law, the arbitrary invocation and reliance on foreign law has become less of a 
concern as well.93 The courts should at least be given freer rein to consider foreign 
developments in evidence law without being unduly hampered by an analysis of whether 
such developments are strictly consistent or not with the EA. 
 
Second, a decision should be made as to whether the general relevancy 
provisions or the specific relevancy provisions should be retained/ repealed, as their 
continued co-existence is fundamentally problematic. As long as the EA maintains an 
inclusionary rather than exclusionary approach towards admissibility of evidence, it may 
make more sense to repeal the general relevancy provisions as they are overly broad and 
potentially render the specific relevancy provisions otiose. The specific relevancy provisions 
should then be expanded and further enumerated as is necessary; general relevancy 
provisions that have been properly used to admit de facto exceptions to exclusionary rules 
may be ported over as well (such as § 6, the basis of res gestae evidence).94 What about § 11 
then – should it be ported over as a basis to admit actus reus similar fact evidence? Insofar as 
it was never meant to be used to admit similar fact evidence, and insofar as its language is too 
broad for the similar fact rule, it should not be ported over. 
 
This leads us to the third recommendation. How then should the similar fact 
rule be expressed statutorily? The preliminary issue that arises is whether §§ 14 and 15 
should be retained. Insofar as they only cover the mens rea aspect of the similar fact rule, 
they should be repealed and replaced with a provision that covers both the actus reus and 
mens rea aspects of the rule – this also solves the problem of § 11. The recommended 
replacement provision, inspired in part by current Australian legislation,95 would comprise 
two parts most commonly associated with similar fact scenarios: one pertaining to tendency 
(or propensity) and the other pertaining to coincidence (which would include extreme similar 
facts like modus operandi).96 The touchstones of relevance and reliability will be built into 
the replacement provision, and it could tentatively look something like this: 
 
                                                 
92 Siyuan, supra note 13, 400. 
93 See generally Goh Yihan and Paul Tan, An Empirical Study on the Development of Singapore Law, 23(1) 
SACLJ 176 (2011). 
94 Supra note 33. 
95 Evidence Act 1995, §§ 97–98. Although § 101 of this statute goes on to state that the balancing test may be 
applied to exclude admissible tendency or coincidence evidence, this section will not be adopted for the reasons 
that have been set out in this paper as to why the balancing test has no place in the EA. Moreover, §§ 97, 98 
have been reworded significantly in the proposed replacement provision. 
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1. Evidence of the past conduct of a person or a tendency that a person has or had is admissible 
to prove that a person has or had a tendency to act in a particular way or to have a particular 
state of mind if the court thinks the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other 
evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have 
significant probative value and is reliable. 
 
2. Evidence that two or more events occurred is admissible to prove that a person did a 
particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any 
similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in 
both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events 
occurred coincidentally if the court thinks the evidence will, either by itself or having regard 
to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have 
significant probative value and is reliable. 
 
3. The party seeking to adduce either of the above evidence must give reasonable notice in 
writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence. 
  
To be clear, the option of assigning less weight to admissible but suspect 
evidence will remain open, and if the general relevancy provisions are retained, the operation 
of these new provisions will not affect the admissibility of circumstantial evidence (provided 
that the relevant general relevancy provisions are satisfied). In addition, some guidance as to 
what constitutes “significant probative value” may be gleaned from Australian cases that 
have interpreted the legislation that has inspired this reformative proposal. There are three 
factors: the cogency of the evidence relating to the conduct of the relevant person (thus, the 
evidence should not be inherently vague or non-contextual); the strength of the inference that 
can be drawn from the evidence as to the tendency to act in a particular way (thus, the 
evidence cannot only weakly indicate that the alleged tendency exists); and the extent to 
which the tendency or absence of coincidence increases the likelihood that the fact in issue 
occurred (thus, the proof of the alleged pattern must contribute to resolving the particular 
factual dispute in question).97  
 
Fourth and finally, the balancing test and the test of “in the interests of 
justice” (whether or not they refer to the same test) should be abolished (hence §§ 32(3) and 
47(4) of the EA should be repealed).98 The test is too broad and vague, and it also conflicts 
with the EA’s conceptualisation of relevance and admissibility. The safeguard of weight, 
particularly in a non-jury system like Singapore, suffices. Concomitantly, the current case 
law that supports the Boardman approach in any form should be considered bad law, though 
this need not be expressed statutorily. Before we depart, there is still the matter of the 
prevention of abuse of process as a normative prism to analyse the EA. While it may seem 
logical to have a provision that states that the court can do anything within its power to 
prevent any abuse of its process,99 it remains unclear what practical consequence this would 
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yield. Certainly the result that should be avoided is the exclusion of evidence, but beyond that 
this issue warrants much further thought – in another endeavour.  
